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DISTRIBUTING HEALTH CARE:
RATIONING AND THE ROLE OF
THE PHYSICIAN IN THE
UNITED KINGDOM NATIONAL
HEALTH SERVICE
Alan Maynardt
INTRODUCTION
T HE POLICY ISSUE is not whether to allocate or "ration"health care, but how, i.e., what rules will be used by society
to determine access to care? These rules will decide who will
receive treatment, who will live in pain and discomfort and
who, in extremes, will be left to die. Such decisions are never
easy for consumers, providers, purchasers and policy makers.
This article will review these issues in the context of the
United Kingdom National Health Service ("NHS"). In the
first section, the goals of the NHS will be examined in terms of
the principles enunciated in legislation. The next section will
look at the practice of rationing in the NHS, processes with
characteristics well-known to all who are familiar with the
practice of medicine! In the third section the role of physicians
in the rationing processes will be examined.
THE GOALS OF THE NHS:
THE PRINCIPLES OF RESOURCE ALLOCATION
The White Paper of the Churchill Government in 1944
stated that:
[T]he Government . . . wants to ensure that in the future
every man, woman and child can rely on getting ... the best
medical and other facilities available; that their getting them
t Alan Maynard is Professor of Economics and Director of the Centre for Health
Economics at the University of York.
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shall not depend on whether they can pay or on any other
factor irrelevant to real need.1
In 1946, an outline of the Labor Government's NHS Bill
stated that the Service "imposes no limits on availability, e.g.,
limitations based on financial means, age, sex, employment or
vocation, area of residence or insurance qualification." 2
Even for these Labor Party legislators there were limits to
the generalization that services were to be free. The exceptions
in the initial legislation were threefold:
a) Charges were to be levied for the repair of spectacles
and appliances broken as a result of negligence;
b) Payments were to be made for services and appliances
provided at levels or standards above the general ser-
vice level (e.g., amenity beds and private NHS hospital
beds);
c) Charges were to be made for domestic help and some
related services.'
Aneurin Bevan, the Labor Party's left wing architect of
the NHS, resisted amendments to make domestic help and re-
lated services free during the passing of the legislation. This
dedicated socialist argued in an almost Thatcherite fashion:
I really must resist this amendment. Does the Hon. Member
suggest that everything shall be free? ...It is a perfectly
reasonable proposition that, where domestic help of this sort
is needed and the persons concerned are able to provide it for
themselves, they should do so, and where they are able to
make a contribution, they should make it . . .it seems to me
to be wholly unjustified that we should provide a service of
this sort without any payment whatever. . . .Our objection
to the means' test was that it was devised for the purpose of
withholding money from people. This means test is for the
purpose of giving services to people who are in need of these
services . . . and where people can make a contribution to-
wards the cost, they should make it.4
1. MINISTRY OF HEALTH, A NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE. CMD. 6502, reprinted in
RODOLF KLEIN. THE POLITICS OF THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE at 10 n.10 (Longman
1983).
2. MINISTRY OF HEALTH. THE NATIONAL HEALTH SERVICE BILL: A SUMMARY OF
THE PROPOSED SERVICE, 1946, Cmd. 6761.
3. Id.
4. Committee State of the National Health Service Bill, House of Commons De-
bates, June 18, 1946 HANSARD COIs. 1561-62.
260 [Vol. 4:259
DISTRIBUTING HEALTH CARE
Rhetoric and ambiguity are the hallmarks of political de-
bate and the precise definition of what is being rejected and
what is being accepted is usually absent. Such vagueness makes
it difficult to hold elected officials accountable and makes the
monitoring of their performance and that of health care man-
agers and clinicians very difficult.
It is perpetrated in more recent times. The ideology of the
Thatcher government was libertarian. Normally, this would
mean that the government would regard access to health care
as part of society's reward system, with people permitted (if not
encouraged) to use their income and wealth to gain better
health care, if they wish, than their fellow citizens in similar
circumstances. The logical consequence of the libertarian ideal
would be that private practice would predominate, with a
"residual" NHS providing a minimum standard of care for the
poor. Inequality in access to care is an inevitable consequence
of the market. Indeed, it is a sign of its success!
In this market "ideal," the consumers would judge the sys-
tem's success by its ability to do what they demand at a time
and place, and in a quantity and quality they require. Produc-
ers would judge the market's success by their ability to make a
good income out of it.
However, the "real" health care market does not work like
this. Doctors act as the patients' agent, mediating their de-
mands for health care. The consumers' capacity to access care
is determined by the reimbursement rules of the insurers and
utilization is constrained by anxieties about "medical indi-
gency" and the fear that insurers will adjust the risk rating of
those consumers who demand "too much" care.5
The complexities of how the "real" health care market
works and the political popularity of the NHS constrained the
pro-market element in the Conservative government and, as a
consequence, Margaret Thatcher argued, at the Conservative
Party Conference in Brighton on October 8, 1982 in the 1983
Election Manifesto, that "the principle that adequate health
care should be provided for all, regardless of their ability to
5. See A. Maynard & A. Williams, Privatization and Health Care, in PRIVATIZA-
TION AND THE WELFARE STATE (J. LeGrand et al. eds., 1984).
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pay, must be the foundation of any arrangements for financing
health care.""
During the debates in 1989-90 about the reform of the
NHS, Mrs. Thatcher argued that an efficient NHS would drive
the private health care sector out of business.
If scarce health care resources are not to be allocated (i.e.,
rationed between competing patients) in a private market ac-
cording to the willingness and ability to pay of patients and
private insurers, what criteria are to be used? The founding
fathers (and mothers) of the NHS wished to allocate health
care according to need. This is set out clearly in the legisla-
tion.7 But how does one define "need?"
Doctors and managers in the NHS treat patients who are
present due to accident or illness, or because physicians, as a
matter of policy, seek out patients for care (e.g., breast cancer
screening). More patients present for care than can be treated.8
Furthermore, due to demographic change and technological in-
novation, the number of potentially beneficial treatments is in-
creasing and, as a consequence, the gap between what can be
done technically and what can be afforded financially is
widening.'
The rationing process in the NHS ideally should consist of
two steps:
1) A Technical Judgement: Which patients would benefit
most from care in terms of enhanced duration and quality of
life (e.g., quality adjusted life years = QALYs)? 10
2) A Social Judgement: Is it worthwhile to treat patients
(i.e., how much will society pay to purchase an additional
QALY)?
The medical experts should provide technical information
about the comparative QALY performance of competing thera-
pies (Step 1). In a society with a national health service, the
6. Margaret Thatcher, Speech to the Conservative Party Conference, October 8,
1982.
7. See supra notes 1, 2 and accompanying text.
8. See, e.g., Jeffery Hailer, Britain's Labour Party Launches Offensive on Health
Service, REUTERS, January 6, 1988 ("Thousands of Britons have been waiting for opera-
tions for more than a year ... ").
9. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 81-2.
10. See Rationing Health Care, THE ECONoMIsT, April 23, 1994, at 17 (explaining
QALY analysis); see also Ray Robinson, Cost Utility Analysis; Economic Evaluation and
Health Care, 307 BRIT. MED. J. 859 (1993).
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politicians, as representatives of the taxpayer, should decide
how much treatment to fund (Step 2). Technical judgements
would prioritize competing treatments, identifying the "best
value for money." Funding judgements would decide how far
down this league table it will be possible to fund treatments.
Below some "plimsoll line," beneficial treatments would not be
funded and patients should be left in pain and discomfort, and
to die. Treatment in an ideal NHS, therefore, would be allo-
cated according to the patient's capacity to benefit from care
and in a manner similar to that attempted in Oregon,"' dis-
cussed in the Netherlands and explored in New Zealand.' 2 It
also may involve, as in Oregon, the use of truth those patients
refused access to care and to be told it is due not to the absence
of effective therapies, but to the lack of finance.' 3 Such honesty
may increase pressure for increased funding of, hopefully, cost-
effective care.
THE GOALS OF THE NHS: THE PRACTICE OF
RESOURCE ALLOCATION.
The principle of resource allocation, the benefit principle,
distilled from the legislation and the legislators' statements re-
quire the clinicians and managers in the NHS to identify what
works (i.e., the cost-effectiveness of competing interventions)
and deliver, with the assistance of suitably designed incentive
systems, those services which give the "biggest bang for the
buck."' 4 This is easier said than done!
The health care system in the U.K. is similar to that in
any other country: cost data are poor, there are large variations
in clinical practice, the little effectiveness data that exist tend
to be ignored, often for many years, and the majority of health
care services in use have no proven scientific basis."5
11. See, e.g., THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION. RATIONING AMERICA'S HEALTH CARE:
THE OREGON PLAN AND BEYOND (Martin A. Strosberg et al. eds., 1992).
12. See Chris Ham, Priorities: When Health Care Goes on the Ration, THE GUARD-
IAN SOCIETY PAGE, Nov. 9, 1994, at 7; GOVERNMENT COMM. ON CHOICES IN HEALTH
CARE. NETH. MINISTRY OF WELFARE, HEALTH AND CULTURAL AFFAIRS, CHOICES IN
HEALTH CARE. DUNNING REPORT (1992); HEALTH CARE REFORMS GROUPS, N.Z. COMMU-
NICATIONS UNIT, HEALTH CARE REFORMS REPORT No. 9 (Apr. 29, 1992).
13. See Ham, supra note 12; THE BROOKINGS INSTITUTION, supra note 11.
14. KLEIN, supra note I, at 81-2; see also id. at 102 n.44.
15. See Steve Iliffe & Ulrich Feudenstein, Fundholding: From Solution to Problem:
United Kingdom's NHS Funding Reforms, 308 BRIT. MED. J. 3 (1994); Chris Ham, Prior-
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The NHS is seen by many Americans as a socialized sys-
tem of health care delivery. While it may be fun to use such
rhetoric in the polemics of the political market place, it has
little basis. Until recently there has been an implicit agree-
ment, described by Rudolf Klein, between the doctors trade
union otherwise known as the British Medical Association
("BMA") and the government that the BMA would not chal-
lenge on funding issues provided the Government did not chal-
lenge on issues of clinical practice.16 This concordat survived
until the 1980s and meant that clinicians determined both who
they treated and how. 17 This discretion remains even after a
decade of Thatcherism and means that the freedom of U.K.
clinicians is generally greater than that of their American peers
working in a "free market." 8
Clinical freedom in a broad sense is complemented in the
NHS by poor data about costs. In the U.S. there are price data
(which do not reveal costs, of course!), but in the U.K. the fi-
nance systems until recently were designed solely to facilitate
expenditure control and adherence to cash limited budgets;
they were not designed to inform anyone about the cost of
procedures.
This absence of cost data is accompanied by poor process
data. There are many hospitals in the U.K. that still do not
have efficient patient administration systems and, as a result, it
is not easy to identify bed occupancy characteristics. 9 Until
1985 there was a national system of activity data - the hospi-
tal activity analysis. This was "redisorganized" in 1986 when
ity Setting in the NHS: Reports from Six Districts; The United Kingdom's National
Health Service, 307 BRIT. MED. 1 435 (1993).
16. KLEIN, supra note 1, at 16-17 (describing the origins of the National Health
Service); id. at 22-23 (detailing BMA discontentment); id. at 23-24 (describing the history
of Bevan's concessions to physicians in 1948); id. at 86-90 (detailing the 1966 compromise
and the implementation of the "Family Doctor Charter").
17. Id. at 121.
18. SHIRLEY ROBIN LETWIN, THE ANATOMY OF THATCHERISM 216-19 (1992)
(describing the "internal market" of the National Health Service).
19. See PAUL KIND. HOSPITAL DEATHS-THE MISSING LINK: MEASURING OUTCOME
IN HOSPITAL ACTIVITY DATA 2-4 (University of York, Centre For Health Economics,
Health Economic Consortium, Discussion Paper 44 1988) (describing the inadequacies of
current data collection methods). See also id. at 1, 27 (further illustrating the impact of
the lack of hospital outcome data).
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the Korner information system was introduced, and as a result
there has been no national data since!20
The data from ad hoc studies show, as in the U.S. from
Wennberg's work, large variations in activity rates. 1 Some sur-
gical activity data from McPherson's work is shown in Table 1.
Remarkable variations exist, even for so-called "emergency"
procedures such as appendectomy. A recent study of the use of
diagnostic dilation and curettage ("D&C") in young women
showed that D&C rates in England were over six times the
U.S. rate: a large proportion of this activity is believed to be
ineffective. 2
TABLE 1.
VARIATIONS IN SURGICAL ACTIVITY RATE23
Rate Per 10,000 Population (Age and Sex Adjusted)
DISTRICTS REGION
PROCEDURE
LOW HIGH LOW HIGH
Hernias 10.0 20.0 8.5 14.5
Hemorrhoids 1.0 4.6 1.3 3.0
Prostatectomy 4.5 9.5 5.8 13.2
Cholecystectomy 7.0 11.0 5.7 9.7
Hysterectomy 7.5 15.0 18.1 28.7
Appendectomy 14.0 21.0 12.9 19.4
Tonsillectomy with and 7.5 27.5 14.0 25.0
without adnoidectomy
Reviewing the effectiveness literature shows that not only
do U.K. doctors "assault" young women with unnecessary
D&C procedures, but they also "assault" young children with
20. Id. at 1 ("there is little or no information on the impact of health care services
on the health of individual patients or the community at large").
21. See, e.g., John E. Wennberg, Jean L. Freeman & William J. Culp, Are Hospital
Services Rationed in New Haven or Over-Utilized in Boston?, THE LANCET, May 23, 1987,
at 1185-89 (1987).
22. See Angela Coulter, Anne Klassen, Ian Z. MacKenzie & Kim McPherson, Diag-
nostic Dilation and Curettage: Is it Used Properly?, 306 BRIT. MED. J. 236 (1993).
23. D. SANDERS. A. COULTER, & K. MCPHERSON, VARIATIONS IN HOSPITAL ADMIS-
SION RATES: A REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE tbl. 3 (Project Paper 79, 1989).
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hearing loss and "glue ears."2 It has been concluded that for
the majority of patients "watchful waiting" was the best treat-
ment policy, since for many the hearing loss remedied itself.2 5
Another study by the same group has shown that the effi-
cacy and acceptability of two competing medications for the
depression are not statistically different .2  However, the latest
treatment (selective serotonin reuptake inhibitors: SSRIs) is up
to thirty times more expensive but is growing in use due to
strong marketing.27  The SSRIs, unlike their rivals the tri-
cyclics, are not toxic in overdose, but the cost of using SSRI to
minimize suicide risks may imply a value of life of hundreds of
thousands of pounds .2  This may be an inefficient use of re-
sources because the most cost-effective treatment may be
tricyclics.
TABLE 2.
PLAUSIBLE SOURCES OF VARIATION AT DIFFERENT
LEVELS OF AGGREGATION 29
Variation Between Morbidity Supply Clinical Demand
GPs S 0 L S
Districts M M L S
Regions L L S M
Countries L L L L
L = Large; M = Medium; S = Small; 0 = No effect relative
to others in row
24. Nick Freemantle et al., The Treatment of Persistent Glue Ear, EFFECTIVE
HEALTH CARE, Bulletin No. 4 , at A.1 at 2 (Centre for Health Economics (York) and
School of Public Health (Leeds), 1992) ("Glue ear is a condition charasterised (sic) by the
presence of fluid (effusion) in the middle ear cavity. It is the most common cause of hear-
ing impairment and reason for elective surgery in children.").
25. Id. 1.2 at 10.
26. See Freemantle et al., supra note 24, at D.1 at 3-4. See also Fujian Song et al.,
Selective Serontin Reuptake Inhibitors: Meta-analysis of Efficacy and Acceptability, 1215
BRIT. MED. J. 683 (1993); N. Freemantle et al., The Treatment of Depression in Primary
Care, EFFECTIVE HEALTH CARE, Bulletin No. 5 (Center for Health Economics (York) and
School of Public Health (Leeds) 1993).
27. Freemantle et al., supra note 26; see also id. at D.12,13 at 6.
28. Id. at D.6 at 5.
29. Kim McPherson, Why Do Variations Occur?, in THE CHALLENGE OF MEDICAL
PRACTICE VARIATIONS 29 (T.F. Anderson et al. eds., 1989).
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The example of the shift in use from tricyclics to SSRIs
based on the results of small studies and vigorous marketing by
the industry demonstrates that clinical behavior can be
changed quite rapidly with well-designed policies.30 Often prac-
tice is very difficult to change as in the case of both glue ears
and D&C interventions where these practices have been ques-
tioned before, but practices have been maintained. This out-
come is due to the lack of attention to the issue of incentives.
In part, this is a function of the focus of the majority of
the health care "actors" on spending and activity. It is unusual
for clinicians in health systems to produce outcome data.3 1 In-
deed, it can be seen that throughout history "externals" to
clinical practice (non-physicians or radical doctors) have
sought to collect this data.
Saddam Hussein's ancestors argued:
If a surgeon has made a deep incision in the body of a man
with a lancet of bronze and saves the man's life, or has
opened an abscess in the eye of a man and has saved his eye,
he shall take 10 shekels of silver.
If the surgeon has made a deep incision in the body of a man
with his lancet of bronze and so destroys the man's eye, they
shall cut off his forehand. 2
A little more recently, the physician to the Prince of
Wales wrote that:
In order, therefore, to procure this valuable collection, I hum-
bly propose, first of all, that three or four persons should be
employed in the hospitals (and that without any ways inter-
fering with the gentlemen now concerned), to set down the
cases of the patients there from day to day, candidly and ju-
diciously, without any regard to private opinions or public
systems, and at the year's end publish these facts just as they
are, leaving every one to make the best use he can for
himself.33
Note that even in those days (over two-hundred-and-sixty
years ago) "the gentlemen now concerned" had to be placated!
30. See supra notes 26-28 and accompanying text.
31. See KIND, supra note 19, at 1-5; Paul Kind, Outcome Measurement Using Hos-
pital Activity Data: Deaths Following Surgical Procedures, 77 BRIT. J. SURGERY 1399
(1990).
32. STANLEY A. COOK. THE LAWS OF MOSES AND THE CODE OF HAMMURABI 246-47
(London 1903) (quoting §§ 215-218 of Hammurabi's Code).
33. FRANCES CLIFTON. THE STATE OF PHYSIC, ANCIENT AND MODERN. BRIEFLY
CONSIDERED: WITH A PLAN FOR THE IMPROVEMENT OF IT (London, 1732).
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By the nineteenth century, Thomas Wahley, the editor of
The Lancet was arguing:
All public institutions must be compelled to keep case-books
and registers, on a uniform plan. Annual abstracts of the re-
sults must be published. The annual medical report of cases
must embrace hospitals, lying-in hospitals, dispensaries, luna-
tic asylums and prisons.3 4
And this advocacy affected policy making. In 1844, the Lunacy
Act required all public psychiatric hospitals to collect outcome
data and distinguished "success" in three categories: dead, re-
lieved and unrelieved.3 5 This they did throughout the nine-
teenth century.36
It was this classification which Florence Nightingale
adopted. She argued:
I am fain to sum up with an urgent appeal for adopting this
or some uniform system of publishing the statistical records
of hospitals. There is a growing conviction that in all hospi-
tals, even those which are best conducted, there is a great
and unnecessary waste of life ...
In attempting to arrive at the truth, I have applied every-
where for information, but in scarcely an instance have I
been able to obtain hospital records fit for any purpose of
comparison. If they could be obtained, they would enable us
to decide many other questions besides the ones alluded to.
They would show subscribers how their money was being
spent, what amount of good was really being done with it, or
whether the money was doing mischief rather than good.37
Despite this history of advocating the collection of out-
come data, the practice is still unusual. Most NHS hospital ac-
tivity systems aggregate discharges so that it is difficult to dis-
tinguish between "horizontal" (dead) and "vertical" (walking)
34. THE LANCET 650-51 (1841).
35. See generally Alison Patrucco Barnes, The Randolph W. Thrower Symposium:
Elder Law: Beyond Guardianship Reform: A Reevaluation of Autonomy and Beneficience
for a System of Principled Decision-Making in Long Term Care, 41 EMORY L J 633, 652
(1992). ("In the late 1800s, changes in society and treatment practices produced changes
in the law. In England, the increasing use of institutional care led to passage of the Lunacy
Act of 1890 which consolidated mental health legislation and attempted to limit the num-
ber of individuals subject to compulsory services by narrowing legal definitions and increas-
ing legal barriers. For the first time, the treatment of the mentally ill was subject to legal
constraints regardless of the need for property management.")
36. Id.
37. Ft ORFNCE NIGHTINGALE, SOME NOTES ON HOSPITALS (3rd ed. 1863).
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discharges!8 Where data are available they show large varia-
tions in mortality 9 which have to be interpreted with care.
The major problem in determining treatment success is
that there are few trial data to demonstrate effectiveness and
cost-effectiveness. It is not unusual to select a therapeutic area
(e.g., rehabilitation or mental health) and from a literature
search identify less than a dozen studies in total.40 All too little
has changed in the period since 1972 when it was argued that
the majority of therapies had no proven scientific basis.41
Victor Fuchs summarized the problem nicely arguing that ten
percent of health care expenditure damaged patients' health,
ten percent had no effect on health, and eighty percent of ex-
penditure improved health.42 The problem is, as Fuchs noted,
that no one knows which therapies lie in the ten and eighty
percent categories. 3
The principles of resource allocation which can be derived
from legislation are not translated into practice in the NHS.
Clinical autonomy in the NHS remains very strong and the
Thatcher health care reforms have yet to impact significantly
on inefficient practice and inefficient practitioners.44
3. Resource Allocation: The Physicians' Role
John Hampton, a cardiologist, wrote over ten years ago
that clinical freedom was dead if it meant the freedom to allo-
cate resources regardless of its impact on the patient's health.45
However, the translation of this principle, that care should be
demonstrably cost-effective, into practice is difficult despite the
38. KIND, supra note 19, at 4-5; see also id. at 7.
39. Id. at 27 ("Differences in mortality rate may be accounted for, at least in part, if
allowance is made for qualitative or quantitive variations in resources provided by Health
Authorities"). See also Kind, supra note 31.
40. See, e.g., MIKE McKENNA. ALAN MAYNARD & KEN WRIGHT. Is REHABILITA-
TION COST EFFECTIVE? (University of York, Centre For Health Economics, Health Eco-
nomics Consortium, Discussion Paper 101 1992); Owen O'Donnell, Alan Maynard, & Ken
Wright, Evaluating Mental Health Care: The Role of Economics, 1 J. MENTAL H. 39
(1992).
41. A.L. COCHRANE. EFFECTIVENESS AND EFFICIENCY 9 (1972) (referring to proof in
the forum of data from randomized controlled trials).
42. Victor R. Fuchs, The "Rationing" of Medical Care, 311 NEw ENG. J. MED.
1572, 1573 (1984).
43. Id.
44. See generally LETWIN, supra note 18, at 199-227.
45. John R. Hampton, The End of Clinical Freedom, 287 BRIT. MED. J. 1237, 1237-
38 (1983).
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articulate advocacy of leaders of medical opinion."' What are
the prerequisites of the translation of the principles of resource
allocation into efficient clinical practice?
The first step is to use the available literature to set stan-
dards or benchmarks of appropriate medical practice. This re-
quires the "distilling" of the literature and its analysis by ex-
pert groups so as to identify indications for particular
interventions. Some nice examples of this approach have been
published by the Rand Corporation for therapeutic areas in-
volving angioplasty, coronary artery bypass grafts, abdominal
aortic aneurysm surgery and other areas."
The definition of appropriateness benchmarks facilitates
the investigation of practice, e.g., case notes and computer files
can be interrogated to determine whether practice was appro-
priate. The results of this can be used to inform future practice
via the processes of medical audit and management review.
Such an investigative approach can identify inappropriate prac-
tice and avoidable deaths.48
Appropriateness defined as effective practice may not be
cost-effective practice. This can be illustrated with a simple ex-
ample: an elderly person with muscle pain due to rheumatism
can use drug X which gives five hours of pain relief or drug Y
which gives ten hours of pain relief. Drug Y is clearly more
effective. However, if drug X costs twenty-five pence per dose
and drug Y costs 120 pence per dose, and neither has any side
effects, drug X is preferred as it is the most cost-effective: five
pence per hour of pain relief from drug X as opposed to twelve
pence per hour of pain relief from drug Y.
46. See, e.g., BRYAN JENNETT. HIGH TECHNOLOGY MEDICINE BENEFITS AND BUR-
DENS 249-250 (1984).
47. L.H. HILBORNE ET AL., CORONARY ARTERY BYPASS GRAFT. A LITERATURE RE-
VIEW AND RATINGS OF APPROPRIATENESS AND NECESSITY (1991); L L LEAPE ET AL, PER-
CUTANEOUS TRANSLUMINAL CORONARY ANGIOPLASTY. A LITERATURE REVIEW AND RAT-
INGS OF APPROPRIATENESS AND NECESSITY (1991); DJ. BALLARD. ABDOMINAL AORTIC
ANUERYSM SURGERY: A LITERATURE REVIEW AND RATINGS OF APPROPRIATENESS AND
NECESSITY. SERIES JRA 04 (1992); D.B. MATCHER. CAROTID ENDATERECTOMY A LITERA-
TURE REVIEW AND RATINGS OF APPROPRIATENESS AND NECESSITY, SERIES JRA 05 (1992).
48. See, e.g., E.A. CAMPLING. H.B. DEVLIN, & J N. LUNN. THE REPORT OF THE NA-
TIONAL CONFIDENTIAL INQUIRY INTO PERIOPERATIVE DEATHS (London 1990) (providing a
description of the confidential enquiry into perioperative deaths ("GEPOP") carried out by
the Royal College of Surgeons and the Association of Anaesthetists).
[Vol. 4:259
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While the number of economic evaluations in health care
is increasing exponentially,49 their quality is uneven.50 As a
consequence while effectiveness data are poor, the knowledge of
cost-effectiveness is generally worse!
Yet, the physician is the key agent in resource allocation:
it is she who determines access to care. In the NHS the general
practitioner acts as the "gate keeper" to the hospital system,
both for diagnostics and for treatment.5 1 The hospital consult-
ant, and her firm of juniors, assess general practitioner referrals
and offer advice and treatment as they judge appropriate.52
The waiting list, approaching one-million, 53 is used to ration
access for non-emergency care, much of which is cost-effective.
Emergency demands are met by open access and the "impera-
tive of rescue" often leads to cost-ineffective interventions.
Without guidelines of appropriateness, the clinician cannot re-
sist patient and relatives' pressure to "do something" when a
seventy-six-year-old man appears in casualty with a bleeding
tumor at 3:00 a.m.! The dictum of Florence Nightingale from
the 1860s not "to strive officiously" to keep the patient alive54
tends to be ignored!
Such responses are complicated by the agency relation-
ship. It is argued that there is an asymmetry of information in
the health care market such that the doctor is the expert with
superior ability to diagnose, treat and predict the outcome of
disease. As a consequence of this, the consumer, after making
her initial decision to enter the health care market, delegates
decision making to the "expert." Thus, the primary agent on
the supply side of the market becomes the agent who makes
demand-side decisions. If those decisions were based on the
predicted marginal productivity of the intervention (the margi-
49. M.E. Backhouse et al., An Economic Evaluation Bibliography, I HEALTH ECON.
4 (Supp. 1992).
50. Standards of "good practice" to appraise such evaluation can be seen in Alan
Williams, The Cost Benefits Approach, 30 BRIT. MED. BULL. 252-56 (1974); see also
MICHAEL F. DRUMMOND, GREG L. STODDART, & GEORGE W. TORRENCE, METHODS FOR
THE ECONOMIC EVALUATION OF HEALTH CARE PROGRAMES (Oxford University Press
1987); Alan Maynard, The Design of Future Cost-Benefit Studies, 3 AM. HEALTH J. 761
(1990).
51. See LETWIN, supra note 18, at 214; see also id. at 217.
52. See KLEIN, supra note 1, at 44; see also id. at 113-114.
53. Dr. Brian Mawhinney Announces Latest Waiting Time Figures, U.K. DEP'T OF
HEALTH (PREss RELEASE) 94/218, May 6, 1994.
54. See NIGHTINGALE, supra note 37.
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nal effect), this agency relationship would produce efficient
treatment patterns. However, if the doctor pursues other
targets, such as income enhancement empire building resource
allocation will be inefficient.
Many markets such as law, real estate and vehicle repair
have some degree of asymmetry in information. After this
problem has been recognized by corporate attempts to control
practices, these are often defeated by the self-interest of the
regulated who capture it and use it to enhance their income
and power: regulation favors the regulated.5 5 These adverse ef-
fects can be dissipated by the production of knowledge to ques-
tion practices and the creation of institutions (e.g., health care
purchasers in managed care) to challenge the corporations.
However, both the creation of such competition and its sustain-
ment is costly and difficult.
The problems created by agency relationships may be
compounded with providers having an increasing commercial
interest in the inflation of demand for health care. It has been
argued that doctors "are not, and should not be businessmen,"
but that market reforms are forcing them to behave in this
way.56 The American Medical Association recognizes that
problems exist when physicians own the medical facilities for
whom they recruit patients.57 Its Council on Ethical and Judg-
ment Affairs recommended no referrals by physicians to self-
owned facilities and that they should invest in facilities only if
no alternative funding is available.58
The physicians' role in resource allocation is central. Typi-
cally, the physicians' scientific training is limited in terms of
their capacity to question and evaluate existing practices. Med-
ical schools tend to inculcate "facts," but place too little aware-
55. G. Stigler, The Theory of Regulation, BELL J. ECON. & MGMT ScI 1, 3-21
(1971).
56. Arnold S. Relhman, What Market Values are Doing to Medicine, THE ATLAN-
TIC MONTHLY, March 1992, at 98-106.
57. See Dana Priest, AMA Delegates Spar Over Self-Referral, WASH POST, Dec. 7,
1992, at A11; Dana Priest, AMA Decrees 'Self-Referral' is Unethical, WASH POST, Dec.
9, 1992, at Al; cf. Brian McCormick, AMA Reverses Self-Referral Stance, 35 AM MED
NEWS 1, Dec. 21, 1992, ("In addition, delegates rescinded a six-month-old policy that con-
flicted with council's ethical stance. That policy said self-referral arrangements were ethi-
cal so long as referring physicians disclosed their investment interests and patients were
informed of alternative sites for receiving care.").
58. See Council on Ethical & Judgment Affairs, Conflicts of Interest: Physician
Ownership of Medical Facilities, 267 JAMA 2366, 2368 (1992).
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ness on the experimental nature of practice and the shallow
knowledge upon which it is established. They are exposed to
strong pressure to treat because, although aware of the social
perspective (i.e., opportunity costs exist for all decisions), they
are trained to treat the individual patient in front of them, with
all the pressures created by the imperative of rescue.
While the profession has regulated itself extensively, those
processes are poorly informed by good science about costs and
outcomes. All too often regulatory bodies such as the U.K.
General Medical Council serves as a mechanism to discipline
deviant practitioners who sleep with their patients, but do not
address the issue of those physicians who are unusually success-
ful in killing or disabling their patients! The U.K. Royal Col-
leges can, by withdrawing membership from practitioners,
leave them unable to practice in the NHS, but this tends to be
a discipline rarely used to control inefficient practitioners. Fur-
thermore, any such discussions are conducted in secret, as was
the CEPOD inquiry.5"
The "managers" of institutions controlling the practice of
medicine are seeking to change the ways in which medical ac-
tivity is conducted. The speed with which they are changing is
slow but not inconsiderable. However, the "market" is requir-
ing non-clinical managers to move more rapidly and there are
risks both of duplication and conflict, particularly with regard
to the acquisition and use of data about clinical practice. Such
"competition" may be harmful. The niive belief that markets
are primarily driven by greed and self-interest was refuted by
the alleged creator of such arguments, Adam Smith, over 200
years ago:
Those general rules of conduct when they have been fixed in
our mind by habitual reflection, are of great use in correcting
the misrepresentations of self-love concerning what is fit and
proper to be done in our particular situation. . . . The regard
of those general rules of conduct, is what is properly called a
sense of duty, a principle of greatest consequence in human
life, and the only principle by which the bulk of mankind are
capable of directing their actions.60
59. CAMPLING. DEVLIN & LUNN, supra note 48. See also KLEIN, supra note 1, at
114 n.25 (describing the U.K. Royal Colleges).
60. ADAM SMITH. THE THEORY OF MORAL SENTIMENTS 160-162 (D.D. Raphael &
A.L. Macfie eds., Oxford 1976).
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If conflict develops about the governance of medicine in
the managed care/internal markets in the 1990s, arguments
about quality may lead to a deterioration in the physician-pa-
tient relationship. Traditionally, patients have believed physi-
cians "do good."61 If knowledge of practice variations, ineffec-
tive care and unproven practice spreads, and patients recognize
the scope of physician-induced demand, there many be substan-
tial effects on physician-patient relationships and resource allo-
cation, notably a reduction in the placebo effect created by, in-
ter alia, physician trust!6" Trust that is merited, that is earned
by the use of truth for those who wish to know, can create
shared decision-making which may improve the cost-effective-
ness of medical practice.
For the "ideal" NHS to work efficiently, priorities must be
determined by where the greatest improvements in caring and
curing can be produced at the margin. Producers will judge the
success of the NHS, in this ideal world, by their ability to pro-
duce cost-effective care.63 To achieve this ideal, the knowledge
base needs to be increased and the results of such evaluative
work used by professional bodies, purchasers and providers to
create a cost-effective health care system.
CONCLUSION
The arguments in this article are in the utilitarian tradi-
tion favored by many economists. Implicit in these arguments
has been an acceptance of the principle of justice of "equality
of treatment for those who are in all relevant respects equal" ' 4
and the interpretation of need for treatment as the capacity of
the patient to benefit at the margin.
The consequence of this is that those with limited capacity
to benefit will be denied care. This may have unfortunate im-
plications for groups who, for reasons such as genetic endow-
ment, income, age and education, may have limited capacity to
61. See Victor R. Fuchs, The Counterrevolution in Health Care Financing, 316
NEw ENG. J. MED 1154, 1155 (1987) ("Physicians have traditionally idealized the ethic of
duty to their patients, and patients have derived considerable comfort from believing that
physicians hold to this ethic").
62. See PETER SKRABANEK & JAMES McCORMICK. FOLLIES AND FALLACIES IN
MEDICINE ch. 1 (1989).
63. MAYNARD & WILLIAMS, supra note 5, at 5.
64. J.M. Stanley, Developing Guidelines for Decisions to Forego Life Prolonging
Medical Treatment, J. MED. ETHICS, Supp. 1992, at 18.
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benefit. If society decides that it wishes to redistribute care to
these needy groups, the opportunity costs of doing so will be
apparent and this will enhance public debate and the accounta-
bility of policy makers.
An important problem in the discussion of resource alloca-
tion rules is, of course, the divergence between the principles
which emerge after much debate, and their implementation. In
the NHS, the rules implicit in legislation nearly fifty years ago
still have little impact on decision making and market transac-
tions. In the NHS there are regular "redisorganizations" to
achieve the Holy Grail of efficiency, equity and justice, but all
too often rhetoric dominates substance just as in the time of the
Emperor Nero:
We trained very hard, but it seemed that every time we were
beginning to form up into teams, we would be reorganized. I
was to learn later in life that we tend to meet any new situa-
tion by reorganizing, and a wonderful method it can be for
creating the illusion of progress, while producing confusion,
inefficiency and demoralization. 65
65. Caius Petronius, AD 66, quoted in Kevin Townsend, New Zealand: Study Finds
"Illusion of Progress" - Health, N.Z. HERALD, Feb. 11, 1993.
2751994]

